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 # CONTROVERSY
 More on the Bakke Decision:
 From Robert M. O'Neil, Kenneth S. Tollett, David E. Feller
 and William Van Alstyne
 Robert M. O'Neil: In his perceptive essay, Professor
 Van Alstyne ("A Preliminary Report on the Bakke
 Case/' AAUP Bulletin, 64 (December, 1978), pp. 286-
 297) has gone well beyond the initial level of analysis
 of the Bakke opinions. What he has done, in fact, is to
 pursue the implications for some considerable dis-
 tance. That process of extrapolation is made vastly
 more difficult by the number and the variance of the
 opinions. As he observes at several points, a defec-
 tion by any of the four Justices comprising either the
 Stevens or the Brennan block could not only alter the
 result, but could also divert the course of the devel-
 oping law. Yet the Court deserves some sympathy
 for reasons that are partly obvious and partly not;
 despite the public excitement over the issue of pref-
 erential use of race, Bakke is for the Supreme Court
 truly a case of first impression. For this reason, as
 well as the intrinsic difficulty of the constitutional is-
 sues, our natural desire (and need) for clear answers
 should be tempered with a measure of understanding
 and patience. Surely the%Court might have done bet-
 ter - and there is evidence in the opinions that a
 higher degree of consensus was once achieved but
 lost later ht the spring. Yet there is also much helpful
 guidance in the opinions, and questions which have
 been so troubling since 1970 can now begin to be re-
 solved.
 Three issues merit further comment here. First,
 Professor Van Alstyne seems uneasy about the defer-
 ence which Justice Powell pays to the admissions
 process in general and more specifically to the com-
 mitment to "diversity" through that process. I must
 confess to some of the same uneasiness, although I
 may be more inclined than he to be grateful even for
 small favors. Given the grudging recognition by the
 courts of academic freedom as an element of first
 amendment protection, one would not have expected
 to find the admissions process suddenly accorded
 such stature. Although Justice Powell does not really
 tell us, presumably both thé .adoption and the appli-
 cation of admissions policies can now claim pro-
 tection comparable to that afforded the statements of
 faculty members and the political organizations of
 students. The claim to be made for including admis-
 sions decisions within academic freedom id a rather
 subtle and intriguing one- a claim that one would
 have expected to be made and accepted at a later
 time in a case more directly presenting the issue.
 After the initial surprise that the argument was so
 readily received when it was not essential to do so-
 surely Justice Powell could have validated "diver-
 sity" as a university interest on other grounds - it
 seems to me one should express relief rather than
 anxiety, and get on about the business of seeking
 new territories to conquer. At the same time, how-
 ever, the casual acceptance of the academic freedom
 claim in Justice Powell's opinion could raise doubts
 about the scope of academic freedom in other di-
 mensions of university life to which it is more cen-
 tral. These issues remain for later cases, and for the
 moment we should take heart that so significant a
 feature of higher education has at least received a
 well-deserved measure of recognition and protection.
 ROBERT M. O'NEIL is Vice President and Professor of Law
 at Indiana University, Bloomington, KENNETH S. TOLLET
 is Distinguished Professor of Higher Education in and Direc-
 tor of the Institute for the Study of Educational Policy, Howard
 University. DAVID E. FELLER is Professor of Law at the
 University of California, Berkeley. WILLIAM VAN AL-
 STYNE is Professor of Law at Duke University.
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 There is another kind of uneasiness, however.
 More explicit is Professor .Van Alstyne's doubt
 whether diversity - however desirable it may be as a
 matter of academic policy - is truly a "compelling"
 interest. Justice Powell says that only such interests
 will suffice to sustain race-conscious programs,
 whether designed to help or to hurt minorities - a
 single standard which has much wisdom. Yet he does
 not offer any formula for determining when an inter-
 est is "compelling" - nor, for that matter, did the
 Court offer any such formula even when they were
 more in accord on such matters as miscegenation
 laws and welfare restrictions, both of which required
 proof of a compelling governmental interest. The
 failure is not simply one of definition but, as Van Al-
 styne suggests, goes deeper. One cannot imagine that
 Justice Powell would uphold a race-conscious pro-
 gram to reduce the minority enrollment - to bring in
 more whites from other states to replace local blacks,
 for example - simply because "diversity" was as-
 serted as the rationale, and a logical connection be-
 tween purpose and means could be proved. Thus,
 despite his rejection of the "double standard"
 adopted by the Brennan group, there is more than a
 hint that Justice Powell has in fact condoned a
 double standard of his own. Evidence of that lapse
 appears not only in the "diversity" section, but in the
 discussion of other possible reasons for using race -
 for example, the desire to meet the medical needs of
 "underserved areas" through special programs. (It is
 hard to believe that Justice Powell would uphold a
 program to force minority medical students or grad-
 uates to serve in rural or ghetto areas at lower in-
 comes simply to achieve the laudable goal of improv-
 ing the distribution of medical manpower. Thus the
 interest that may well be "compelling" when minor-
 ities are helped may be vulnerable when it underlies
 a classification harmful to minorities).
 If Professor Van Alstyrte is justifiably critical of the
 Powell opinion, it seems to me he may be a bit harsh
 on the Brennan group. While the adoption of a dual
 standard for racial classifications is troublesome - the
 more so because it makes de jure what remains at
 most de facto in the Powell opinion - not all the dire
 predictions necessarily follow. Toward the end of the
 essay, we are warned that four Justices have vali-
 dated a "theory of racial quotas and racial double
 standards quite sufficient to fuel a generation or
 more of ethnic politics under a new order which will
 consciously distribute opportunity in this country by
 explicit racial percentages and specific ethnic classifi-
 cations" (p. 297). Surely the Brennan group is not
 monolithic. There is, for example, Justice Blackmun's
 clear plea that race-conscious remedies should be
 considered "transitional," and should last only as
 long as the catalytic conditions persist. There is also
 the insistence of the Brennan group that programs
 for minorities must be addressed to "societal" dis-
 crimination - thus implying serious doubts about fa-
 voritism for groups (e.g., Vietnamese, Cubans) who
 may indeed be underrepresented but have not been
 victims of past racial discrimination in this country.
 One must also take seriously the Brennan caveat that
 programs must not be stigmatizing; while the Davis
 program may well survive this test, special remedial
 tracks and surely anything like differential grading
 policies would get few if any votes from the Brennan
 group. (In fact, the Brennan group seems stricter on
 the "stigma" issue than Justice Powell; programs de-
 signed to achieve "diversity" might well win his ap-
 proval even if the beneficiaries were in some measure
 stigmatized.)
 The point is that the Brennan opinion, despite its
 rather casual acceptance of a dual standard for racial
 classifications, is qualified in other ways. One could
 well infer that the Davis program represents its outer
 limit, and that any extension of its race-conscious
 elements (for example, by admitting the sixteen
 "Task Force" students directly rather than going
 back through the general admissions committee)
 might lose the vote of at least one Justice.
 It is for this reason that I would take minor issue
 with one other part of Professor Van Alstyne's analy-
 sis: the suggestion that plans factually very close or
 even identical to the one before the Court might be
 sustained under slightly different circumstances. He
 offers as one example a program not subject to the
 provisions of Title VI - something of a rarity given
 the extent to which federal funds pervade those insti-
 tutions which maintain highly desirable and there-
 fore selective programs. (Even on the private campus,
 though federal funds may not be withdrawn from
 any but the offending unit, there is a persuasive argu-
 ment that racial discrimination is forbidden in all
 areas of university life by the receipt of federal fund-
 ing for any purpose). Moreover, this conclusion
 would follow only in the unlikely event that one
 member of the Stevens group were to reach the con-
 stitutional issue and decide it as the Brennan group
 did. It seems more likely that the members of the
 Stevens group would have some trouble even with
 Justice Powell's position on a factually similar case,
 much less with the Brennan position. The possibility
 of a majority of five votes to uphold anything that
 closely resembles the Davis program seems remote
 and elusive. It would be far safer if those who are
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 concerned with admissions policies took as their
 starting point the clear invalidity of the Davis pro-
 gram, and went on from there. Whether or not one
 calls this program a quota is unimportant, as Justice
 Powell wisely cautioned. What is important is that
 five Justices found the dual-track admissions system
 to be racially exclusionary (albeit on different
 grounds). The negative import of the decision is as
 significant as the positive implication that race may
 be used under different conditions. The quest for al-
 ternatives will be aided by an early and unequivocal
 rejection of the Davis model. Many other options,
 which are both fairer and more sophisticated, exist
 and should be tried by institutions which genuinely
 seek to expand educational opportunity in constitu-
 tionally valid ways.
 Kenneth S. Tollett: Professor Van Alstyne's prelimi-
 nary report on the Bakke case is most subtle, illumi-
 nating, and insightful. I have little quarrel with his
 summary of the case except for his characterization
 of the regular admissions program at Davis as select-
 ing from "the best" of the applicants in con-
 tradistinction to the special admissions program, pre-
 sumably not selecting from among the best. In this
 connection, Justice Blackmun's opinion deserved
 more attention from Professor Van Alstyne. Justice
 Blackmun recognized that "the selection process in-
 evitably results in the denial of admission to many
 qualified persons, indeed to far more than the number
 of those who are granted admission." It is most im-
 portant at the outset to recognize that in a decision-
 making arena where there are competing contestants,
 the values and goals of the game or the enterprise
 should be decisive in determining who will win or
 lose. Thus, to the extent that the mission of the uni-
 versity includes ethnip diversity and the redress of soci-
 etal discrimination, "the best" necessarily embraces
 some of those in the special admissions program.
 I have one other principal reservation or objection
 to Professor Van Alstyne's descriptive character-
 ization of the case. He states that the question the
 Court decided "was whether racially separate and
 unequal admissions standards are . . . constitution-
 ally condemned." I would prefer to restate the ques-
 tion: whether a racially sensitive admissions program
 which seeks to insure diversity and redress societal
 discrimination is constitutional. This difference in
 characterization, I believe, has considerable influence
 on how one will react to the decision. Thus, although
 The basic message should be clear. The Supreme
 Court did not ban all use of race in the admissions
 process, though they did ban one particularly heavy-
 handed preferential program. The responsibility of
 persons who shape higher education policy - beyond
 as well as within colleges and universities - is to
 adapt as best we can to changing, though clearer,
 constitutional conditions. A person of good will and
 conscience cannot find in the Bakke opinions any
 basis for relaxation of affirmative action or equal op-
 portunity programs. Indeed, the fact that some may
 now find an excuse for temporizing or even with-
 drawing makes a renewed commitment on the part
 of others even more urgent. There is much work yet
 to be done, and no shortage of imaginative re-
 sponses.
 Professor Van Alstyne accurately and fairly, indeed
 subtly, analyzes the case, he nevertheless tilts the
 reader's mind in a negative direction toward the spe-
 cial admissions program by stating the question so
 that it resonates philosophically in opposition to the
 Brown decision. Moreover, his characterizing the
 fundamental notion of Anglo-American jurispru-
 dence of remedying wrongs as "the amortization of
 the national racial debt" says something about his
 sensitivity to the pervasive and vicious mistreatment
 of blacks and some other oppressed minority groups.
 Major Supreme Court decisions like Bakke have al-
 ways had different levels of meaning and implica-
 tion. Lawyers and some other individuals who con-
 scientiously want to be governed by what the Court
 decides will comb through such opinions with clear
 and different perspectives or biases and develop
 some plausible meaning or interpretation of the deci-
 sion. If one has very high expectations regarding the
 reservoir of decency and rationality of the Supreme
 Court and this society, such an individual, notwith-
 standing his positive perspective toward affirmative
 action, may find very much that is disturbing in the
 opinion, particularly if he is familiar with the sorry
 history of the United States Supreme Court. Of
 course, there is another level which may be more
 symbolic and provocative than anything else, but
 probably, in political decisions like this, is the most
 important. One may ask simplistically who won and
 who lost the case? I fear that this kind of simplistic
 popular analysis of the Bakke decision may in the
 long run be the most decisive and disturbing aspect
 of the case. Certainly, to Professor Van Alstyne's
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 credit, he has not given a simplistic analysis of the
 opinion.
 Whatever one may say about the special admis-
 sions program at the Davis Medical School of the
 University of California, it unquestionably was de-
 signed to bring more minorities into thé medical pro-
 fession, including blacks. An assault on the special
 minority admissions program at Davis was inevitably
 and inescapably an assault upon bringing more mi-
 nority groups into medical schools and thus into
 higher education. Although some may have been sin-
 cerely motivated by the notion of racial neutrality in
 supporting Bakke in his case, an unavoidable out-
 come of such an assault was to undermine the legiti-
 macy and, in some minds, the desirability of making
 special efforts to educate blacks and other minority
 groups. One cannot now fully foresee the con-
 sequences of the Bakke decision, although it can im-
 mediately be seen that it was partially reassuring for
 Justice Powell in announcing the judgment of the
 Court to state that race may be taken into account in
 the admissions process. (It is significant to note that
 although medical school enrollment is up, the black
 total is down. The Association of American Medical
 Colleges has recently released findings that reveal
 that the number of blacks in the nation's medical
 schools declined this year despite an increase in
 overall medical school enrollment, and the propor-
 tion of blacks in the first-year medical class is now
 the lowest it has been since 1970.)
 It was disappointing for Justice Powell to write that
 the special minority admissions program could not
 be justified upon the basis of "remedying . . . the ef-
 fects of 'societal discrimination/ " a concept of injury
 he found "amorphous" and that might be "ageless in
 its reach into the past."
 So much has been written and said about Justice
 Powell's opinion - with the main substantive argu-
 ments of which no other Justice indicated agree-
 ment - that I will say little more about it. (To Profes-
 sor Van Alstyne's further credit, he did give
 considerable attention to Justice Brennan's opinion in
 his postscript.) Justice Powell regarded the use of
 race or ethnic background in the admissions process
 as suspect and rejected three of the four purposes the
 program purported to serve. The three rejected pur-
 poses were reducing the historic underrepresentation
 of minorities in medical schools and the professions,
 remedying the effects of societal discrimination, and
 increasing the number of physicians who practice in
 underserved communities. The fourth purpose he ac-
 cepted, namely, "obtaining the educational benefits
 that flow from an ethnically diverse student body."
 However, he rejected the Davis method of consid-
 ering race because although " 'the race of an appli-
 cant may tip the balance,' the factor of race in con-
 tributing to diversity may not be decisive." Back in
 Oklahoma we would characterize such language as
 "speaking with forked tongue."
 Professor Van Alstyne fairly and correctly states
 that Justice Brennan in his concurring and dissenting
 opinion, in which three other Justices joined, thought
 government may take race into account when it does
 not demean or insult any race and was designed to
 remedy disadvantages cast on a race by past racial
 prejudices or discrimination. Justice Brennan thought
 the legacy of slavery and the turning of the Equal
 Protection Clause "against those whom it was in-
 tended to set free" in the separate-but-equal doctrine
 justified taking race into account in the admissions
 process.
 In rejecting the argument that Title VI of the 1964
 Civil Rights Act required color blindness, he wrote:
 It is inconceivable that Congress intended to encourage
 voluntary efforts to eliminate the evil of racial discrimina-
 tion while at the same time forbidding the voluntary use of
 race-conscious remedies to cure acknowledged or obvious
 statutory violations.
 Thus, since the racial classification in the Davis pro-
 gram served an important and articulated purpose,
 did not stigmatize or single out any group "least well
 represented in the political process to bear the brunt
 of a benign program," and sought to remedy the ef-
 fects of societal discrimination which resulted in a
 substantial and chronic underrepresentation of mi-
 norities in medical schools, access to which was im-
 peded by the handicaps of past discrimination, it did
 not violate the Constitution. After reviewing prior
 relevant cases of the Court, Justice Brennan con-
 cluded:
 Properly construed, therefore, our prior cases unequivo-
 cally show that a state government may adopt race-con-
 scious programs if the purpose of such programs is to re-
 move the disparate racial impact its actions might
 otherwise have and if there is reason to believe that the
 disparate impact is itself the product of past discrimina-
 tion, whether its own or that of society at large. There is no
 question that Davis' program is valid under this test.
 I have quoted at length from Justice Brennan's opin-
 ion because I think undue attention has still been
 given to Justice Powell's opinion.
 A discussion of the Bakke case from a perspective
 favorable to affirmative action and special minority
 admissions programs should give more attention to
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 Justice Blackmun's and Justice Marshall's opinions.
 At the very outset I alluded to Justice Blackmun's
 forthright recognition of how the admissions process
 actually operates in selective admissions programs.
 Two other quotations from Justice Blackmun's opin-
 ion I think are worthy of special attention in a jour-
 nal directed primarily at university professors. He
 wrote further about the admissions process:
 It is somewhat ironic to have us so deeply disturbed over a
 program where race is an element of consciousness, and
 yet to be aware of the fact, as we are, that institutions of
 higher learning, albeit more on the undergraduate than the
 graduate level, have given conceded preference up to a
 point to those possessed of athletic skills, to the children of
 alumni, to the affluent who may bestow their largess on the
 institutions, and to those having connections with celebri-
 ties, the famous, and the powerful.
 And finally, with almost an existentialist's appre-
 ciation for the starkly subtle paradox, he concludes:
 I suspect that it would be impossible to arrange an affirm-
 ative action program in a racially neutral way and have it
 successful. To ask that this be so is to demand the impos-
 sible. In order to get beyond racism, we must first take ac-
 count of race. There is no other way. And in order to treat
 some persons equally, we must treat them differently. We
 cannot - we dare not - let the Equal Protection Clause per-
 petrate racial supremacy.
 In the discussions of the Bakke case, very little at-
 tention has been given to Justice Marshall except that
 a few commentators have called his opinion emo-
 tional, although eloquent. Justice Marshall, in his
 opinion, catalogues in stark terms the history of un-
 equal treatment afforded to blacks and its relation-
 ship to our present circumstances. He recites statis-
 tics that set forth the difference between blacks and
 whites which should shock the conscience of all de-
 cent human beings. However I am sure most readers
 of Academe know about the shorter life expectancy of
 blacks, the high infant mortality rate of blacks, the
 difference in family incorrie and unemployment rates
 and the gross underrepresentation of blacks in the
 various high-status trades and professions. If one is
 familiar with those statistics, one approaches this
 case from a different perspective. Instead of quoting
 Marshall's poignant recital of those statistics, I would
 like to quote at length from another part of his opin-
 ion. He writes the following about the Court's judg-
 ment:
 While I applaud the judgment of the Court that a univer-
 sity may consider race in its admissions process, it is more
 than a little ironic that, after several hundred years of
 class-based discrimination against Negroes, the Court is
 unwilling to hold that a class-based remedy for that dis-
 crimination is permissible. In declining to so hold, today's
 judgment ignores the fact that for several hundred years
 Negroes have been discriminated against, not as individ-
 uals, but rather solely because of the color of their skins. It
 is unnecessary in twentieth century America to have indi-
 vidual Negroes demonstrate that they have been victims of
 racial discrimination; the racism of our society has been so
 pervasive that none, regardless of wealth or position, has
 managed to escape its impact. The experience of Negroes
 in America has been different in kind, not just in degree,
 from that of other ethnic groups. It is not merely the his-
 tory of slavery alone but also that a whole people were
 marked as inferior by the law. And that mark has endured.
 The dream of America as the great melting pot has not
 been realized for the Negro; because of his skin color he
 never even made it into the pot.
 The Bakke decision was unstable and in certain re-
 spects indecisive. Surely any university sincerely
 committed to affirmative action and special minority
 admissions programs has little reason on the basis of
 the Bakke case to discontinue such programs. Yet one
 wonders why affirmative action and special minority
 admissions programs have caused so much trouble in
 academe; for as Paul Jablow has recently written, "If
 integration was to work at any place in society, it
 should have worked in the faculties in America's col-
 leges and universities." One of the statistics Justice
 Marshall gives in his review of the status of blacks in
 this country is that they make up "2.6 per cent of the
 college and university professors."
 It is a melancholy fact to reflect upon that once the
 principles and procedures of affirmative action ex-
 plicitly were made applicable to higher education,
 the most sustained, insidious, and probably effective
 assault on affirmative action came from those closely
 associated with academe. I am not insensitive to the
 real problems and difficulties imposed upon those
 who, even conscientiously and sympathetically, try
 to abide by the procedural and substantive require-
 ments of affirmative action. The problems and diffi-
 culties are small in comparison to the wrongs that
 have been committed and the social benefits to be re-
 ceived by those who have been excluded and denied
 for so long.
 Although the immediate result of the Bakke case
 may be to leave things in a vague muddling state, no
 one can doubt the depth of the philosophical con-
 flicts involved. It appears that the Supreme Court is
 reflecting the mood of the majority of white Ameri-
 cans that the interests of that majority are being dis-
 placed by affirmative efforts towards equality and
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 justice. Unable to find solutions to the short-term ex-
 aggerated problems facing the country, the negative
 reaction of the people seems to have spread to the
 learned men and women in academe whom we look
 to for counsel on the larger questions of justice.
 I believe Professor Van Alstyne is correct when he
 states that Justice Powell shows considerable def-
 erence to universities in accepting as a legitimate
 purpose of admissions programs the attaining of ra-
 cial or ethnic diversity. One can argue that this is a
 value peculiar to academe and deference may appro-
 priately be given to it. Although I take a somewhat
 purist view regarding the missions and goals of
 higher educational institutions, yet believe racial div-
 ersity is a legitimate educational goal, I am more
 comfortable with institutions taking race into ac-
 count to remedy societal discrimination. At least I
 think the Equal Protection Clause and the Constitu-
 tion clearly permit that, in a way I am not sure they
 necessarily condone racial diversity as an expression
 of academic freedom. Moreover, I subscribe to the
 third purpose of higher education in the Carnegie
 Commission Report and Recommendations in The
 Purposes and the Performances of Higher Education in
 the United States: "The enlargement of educational
 justice for the postsecondary age group." The Com-
 mission further recommended regarding this pur-
 pose:
 A determined effort to provide places in college for young
 persons who wish to attend from low-income and minority
 groups, with adequate financial assistance for their support
 and with respect for their cultural backgrounds.
 A greater concern for the opportunities available to the to-
 tal postsecondary age group, and for the total contribution
 of postsecondary education to the achievement of social
 justice. [P.4]
 Finally, unlike Professor Van Alstyne, I emphatically
 agree with Justice Blackmun that in order to get
 beyond racism, we must first take account of race. It
 is remarkable to me that a person of Professor Van
 Alstyne's obvious good will, good intentions, and
 high intelligence, could think the contrary.
 David E. Feller: Bill Van Alstyne's otherwise superb
 description of what the Supreme Court did in Bakke
 (as opposed to what the newspapers and magazines
 have reported that it did) omits a few, but important,
 elements.
 The most important is that he fails to note, let
 alone emphasize, the most significant fact about the
 case: that there was, indeed, an opinion of "the
 Court," binding as precedent, as distinguished from
 separate opinions which agree only on the judgment
 and which are, in ,no sense, the law. That opinion
 consists of just two sentences, separately para-
 graphed for this purpose, in the Powell opinion
 which were explicitly concurred in by the four Jus-
 tices who joined in the Brennan opinion. Those two
 sentences are the only authoritative statements of
 law in the Bakke case. They read as follows:
 In enjoining petitioner from ever considering the race of
 any applicant, however, the Courts below failed to recog-
 nize that the State has a substantial interest that legiti-
 mately may be served by a properly devised admissions
 program involving the competitive consideration of race
 and ethnic origin. For this reason, so much of the Califor-
 nia court's judgment as enjoins petitioner from any consid-
 eration of the race of any applicant must be reversed.
 This utterance (along with the conclusion, al-
 though not in identical language, of Mr. Justice Pow-
 ell and the Brennan four on the proposition that Title
 VI proscribes only those racial classifications that
 would violate the Constitution) is a decision of "the
 Court" and, hence, authoritative. Nothing else is. In-
 stitutionally the court is as free to decide subsequent
 cases as if all the other language of the opinion did
 not exist.
 That language may, of course, be helpful in specu-
 lating as to how the individual members of the Court
 will vote in subsequent cases, as are comments made
 in oral argument or prior statements by newly ap-
 pointed Justices; but it is important for others to dis-
 tinguish, as the Justices themselves do, between pro-
 nouncements concurred in by a majority of the
 Justices and individual opinions which support the
 result reached but not the reasoning.
 The second comment concerns not an omission
 but an addition. Van Alstyne says that the four Jus-
 tices in the Stevens group interpreted Title VI of the
 Civil Rights Act "as a flat prohibition of any school
 which receives federal assistance from employing
 more rigorous admissions standards under which are
 excluded some students who might otherwise have
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 been admitted but for the reservation of places for
 students judged by more permissive standards solely
 because of their race" (p. 287). They didn't. Nor did
 they say that "separate and unequal admission poli-
 cies ... are ... forbidden." They did say that Title VI
 of the Civil Rights Act prohibited exclusion on the
 basis of race. And it is undoubtedly tempting, since
 they also concluded that Allan Bakke had been ex-
 cluded on the basis of his race, to insert into their
 opinion the words which Van Alstyne does as to the
 use of differing or separate admission standards to
 accomplish this exclusion. But, tempting though it
 be, it is improper to attempt to fill the interstices of
 the Stevens opinion in this way, since the opinion ex-
 pressly says that it does not purport to express any
 opinion as to "whether race can ever be used as a
 factor in an admissions decision" either under the
 Constitution or under Title VI.
 All that we know from the Stevens opinion, and
 clearly all that the Stevens opinion is intended to tell
 us, is that in the view of those four Justices Bakke
 was excluded from the University because of his
 race. They carefully, and I believe deliberately, re-
 frained from telling us what characteristic of the
 Davis program it is that leads to this conclusion. We
 therefore do not, and cannot, know what variant on
 the Davis program would, in their view, pass muster
 under Title VI. My own guess is that this elision is
 the result of a disagreement among the four as to the
 reasoning by which the conclusion was reached that
 was suppressed in order to have an opinion sup-
 ported by the same number of Justices as joined the
 Brennan opinion and thus prevent that opinion from
 being the "lead" opinion. The objective was achieved
 by omitting any reasoning and inserting the blunt
 statement that the opinion is not to be regarded in
 any way as a statement of views as to the propriety
 under Title VI, let alone the Constitution, of the use
 of race in the admissions process. The result is that
 we have four Justices* who say that race can be used
 as it was at Davis, one Justice who says that race can
 be used, although not in the way that Davis used it,
 and four Justices who express no opinion on that
 question, either under Title VI or under the Consti-
 tution, other than the bald and unexplained state-
 ment that it was used to exclude Bakke in violation
 of Title VI.
 Once we start to speculate, as Van Alstyne quite
 properly does, as to what this collection of in-
 determinacies means for future litigation, there is an-
 other unknown which he omitted. One of the issues
 argued by the parties, at the Court's request, was
 whether the provision of Title VI relied upon by the
 four Justices who joined in the Stevens opinion
 would support a private right of action. The Stevens
 four said that it would; Powell and the Brennan four
 said that even if it would it would make no differ-
 ence, since Title VI embodied only the constitutional
 restriction. Hence there was no majority for the
 proposition that there is a private right of action un-
 der Title VI, and Mr. Justice White - although agree-
 ing with the substantive result of the Brennan opin-
 ion - specifically noted his view that it would not.
 The question is currently pending before the Court
 in connection with the identical provisions relating to
 sex discrimination in Title IX, Cannon v. University of
 Chicago, certiorari granted July 3, 1978 (five days af-
 ter Bakke). If a majority should now hold that Title IX
 (and hence Title VI) provides no basis for a private
 action, the members of the Stevens group would
 then, in any Bakke recurrence, be obliged to reach the
 constitutional question and one or more of them may
 very well join the Brennan four, as Van Alstyne notes.
 The possibility that the occasion for such a decision will
 arise as a result of a holding that Title VI does not sup-
 port a private right of action is at least as large, in my
 view, as the probability that this result will occur be-
 cause those four will regard themselves as bound by
 the majority decision in Bakke that Title VI imposes no
 greater restrictions than the Constitution.
 Finally, as to the descriptive portion of the article, I
 believe that some mention should be made of the
 fact that Powell appended to his opinion the Harvard
 College statement as to its admissions program and
 explicitly endorsed it as constitutionally permissible.
 The Harvard program, as set forth in the appendix to
 the opinion, says explicitly that attention is paid to
 numbers in awarding "plus" points based on race.
 Obviously, if the purpose of the "plus" is diversity
 there is some point at which it is achieved, i.e., a
 maximum. And Harvard says that, although there is
 no firm minimum, "it would not make sense" to ad-
 mit as few as 1 per cent or 2 per cent blacks. Surely
 Mr. Justice Brennan is correct in saying that it can
 make no constitutional difference whether the num-
 ber used in a special admissions program is openly
 stated or kept within the confines of the room in
 which admissions decisions are made. We are there-
 fore entitled to conclude from Mr. Justice Powell's
 explicit approval of the Harvard program that an ad-
 missions program involving consideration of race
 and ethnic origin is not to be condemned as improp-
 erly devised, to use the Court's words, if it includes
 consideration of the number of persons who will be
 admitted on the basis of considerations of race.
 Nor, analytically, would it seem to make any dif-
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 ference if the desired number of minority admissions
 is achieved by assigning a "plus" based on race to
 some of the competitors or by reserving a number of
 places for which nonminority applicants are ineli-
 gible. Powell's opinion would apparently require
 Davis, for example, to say to the 100 students who
 would have been admitted there in the absence of its
 special admissions programs that each is entitled to
 compete for all of the places, but he would permit
 Davis to award "plus" points to their minority com-
 petitors so designed that the result of the individual
 competition he requires would be some number, let
 us say ten, of minority admissions. The Brennan
 group, on the other hand, would permit the outright
 reservation of ten places for minority applicants. But
 the difference between a 90 per cent chance at 100
 seats and a 100 per cent chance at 90 seats seems
 only to be that in the former case the imperfection in
 the calculation of the "plus" as applied to successive
 classes may lead to less precise results.
 In essence, then, the difference between the Powell
 view and that of the Brennan four is not the differ-
 ence between a one-track and a dual or triple-track
 system, for a one-track system with "plus" points
 can produce no more or less inequality than a mul-
 tiple-track system without them. Or, to put the mat-
 ter in Van Alstyne's words, the result in either case
 "is necessarily to displace certain persons from posi-
 tions . . . they would otherwise have filled but for
 which they are now rendered ineligible ..." (p. 295).
 The differences between the Powell and the Bren-
 nan views as to the requirements of a properly de-
 vised admissions program involving consideration of
 race are essentially two. First, as indicated, the Pow-
 ell prescription seems to require secrecy and vague-
 ness while Brennan would permit openness and pre-
 cision. As a lawyer I prefer the latter, but I am not at
 all sure that there are not genuine advantages to the
 former. Nor do I believe that Mr. Justice Powell is so
 obtuse as not to have understood exactly what he
 was doing. The Court was faced with an apparently
 unbridgeable gap between two positions, behind
 both of which large social forces had been mar-
 shalled, and the potential of a political explosion if
 either position were explicitly sustained. The option
 of simply refusing to hear the case was foreclosed
 because the California Court had come down firmly
 on one side. The mootness "out" was not available.
 Hence, he elected a solution which essentially said to
 the professional schools of America that they could
 continue, with one possible exception, to do pretty
 much what they were doing provided they disguised
 it a little. There are both principled and practical ob-
 jections to the requirement of ambiguity which he
 raises to constitutional dimension. It thrusts upon
 educators the dubious task of engaging in double
 talk in order to justify consideration of race. Appar-
 ently, however, the Justice - as well as the distin-
 guished institutions which urged this course of ac-
 tion1 - believed that the political advantages of
 vagueness and imprecision were worth the cost.
 There remains, of course, a second and possibly
 substantive reason why Powell did not regard the
 Davis program as "properly devised" while the Bren-
 nan group did. Powell justifies distinctions based on
 race only on diversity grounds and would therefore,
 at least implicitly, require that factors other than race
 be used in providing "plus" points (or their negative
 equivalent, handicaps). The Brennan four would not.
 On the other hand, the Brennan view justifies the use
 of differential standards as a "remedial measure" to
 counter the effects of past discrimination against the
 preferred groups, and thus limits their permissible
 use to those situations. Powell would impose no such
 limitation: any distinction in the name of diversity
 will apparently do. The difference may be part of the
 obfuscatory design of the Powell opinion: the racial
 line is not really so clear if you draw others, or say
 you are drawing others, as well. I put this aside how-
 ever (and, as well, the latitude which the Powell view
 would at least appear to provide for distinctions
 based on religion, political affiliation, or other attrib-
 utes that could possibly be said to contribute to div-
 ersity) in order to confront directly Van Alstyne's
 postscript addressed to the Brennan position.
 Van Alstyne characterizes the Brennan justifica-
 tion (and, hence, limitation) as a system of "racial
 transfer payments" to amortize the racial national
 debt and says that those of the majority chosen to
 pay are the least likely to be those who benefited
 from the prior injustice. On this basis he concludes
 that if the Davis program can thus be justified it is in-
 complete. Why not a preference in all things: jobs,
 government contracts, faculty positions, even space
 in professional journals. Why not, I might add to this
 parade, lower income tax rates for blacks than for
 whites, thus - given a progressive rate structure - as-
 sessing most heavily those who have benefited most
 from the presumed past discrimination against
 blacks?
 The answer, it seems to me, is that Van Alstyne
 has forgotten that the Bakke case involved education,
 'Columbia, Harvard, Stanford, and the University of
 Pennsylvania.
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 not the awarding of prizes or money. The state's pur-
 pose in providing professional schools is not to give
 rewards to the most deserving, or to provide a payoff
 for the best, but to provide training. Concededly,
 those trained do receive a benefit and, given the vir-
 tual guarantee of high earnings which graduation
 from medical school confers, it is perhaps under-
 standable that the system for allocating the available
 positions in medical schools therefore be seen as a
 system of allocating rewards.
 Understandable, but wrong. That those admitted
 to school receive a benefit is an incident to a system
 primarily designed to select those whose education
 will best serve society's purposes, not to give benefits
 to the most "deserving." Thus, in the medical school
 context, preference for an applicant who comes from
 and who is likely to return to a rural area over an ur-
 ban applicant does not signify that the city dwellers
 owe a debt to the farmers which is being amortized
 or that the rural applicant is in any sense more de-
 serving. Equally, the suggestion made by many, and
 hinted at in the Powell opinion, that the purposes of
 special admissions programs can be served more
 constitutionally by providing special pre-medical-
 school training for minority applicants in order to
 better prepare them for an admissions process that is
 run without regard to race is nonsense: if it is uncon-
 stitutional to prefer minority applicants at the seven-
 teenth year of the educational process, it is equally
 unconstitutional at the sixteenth or at the first. If a
 law school may not constitutionally set aside places
 for minority applicants, CLEO cannot constitution-
 ally provide special prelaw training for minority
 would-be applicants.
 For the same reasons Van Alystyne's inference
 from the Brennan position does not follow. He says
 that the not unreasonable Brennan view that the fail-
 ure of minorities to present the same level of qualifi-
 cations as white applicants is due to the effect of past
 discrimination is incomplete if it does not also perr
 mit, or indeed require, that all other public benefits
 be allocated on a racial basis. What was involved in
 Bakke was the allocation of educational resources to
 serve the objective of providing society with at least
 some minority doctors. Preferential treatment in the
 admissions process was required in order to achieve
 this objective because there was room for only a tiny
 proportion of those fully qualified for the training
 and past discrimination differentially affected the cri-
 teria by which those to be trained were chosen. The
 use of racial preference to balance the effect of past
 discrimination in order to achieve the desired prod-
 uct mix need imply nothing as to the use of race as a
 measure of just deserts.
 I fully recognize that it is improper to draw gener-
 alizations from one or two particular cases. But since
 Van Alstyne has chosen to use Allan Bakke's per-
 sonal background to illustrate the problem he sees in
 the Brennan position, it is perhaps appropriate to
 conclude in the same vein. Allan Bakke, he says,
 came from a working class family: his father was a
 postman. My point (and Brennan's) as to the linger-
 ing effect of past discrimination is made if we add
 that Bakke's home environment included a mother
 who had received a bachelor's degree from the Uni-
 versity of Minnesota at a time when the number of
 blacks enrolled there, if any, must have been min-
 uscule, and that he himself graduated from Coral
 Gables High School in Dade County, Florida, a
 school which no black could have attended because
 "complete actual segregation of the races, both as to
 teachers and pupils, still prevailed ..." (Gibson v.
 Board of Public Instruction of Dade County, Florida,
 272 F.2d 763, 766 CA 5 1959).
 William Van Alstyne: Professors Tollett and Feller
 chide me for what seemed to them an unduly nega-
 tive description of the question in the Bakke case.
 That description was, as the reader may recall:
 "whether racially separate and unequal admissions
 standards are constitutionally condemned." In con-
 trast, Professor Tollett chose a very different formu-
 lation which, incidentally, is nearly the same as the
 manner the Regents also chose to describe the ques-
 tion in their Supreme Court Brief. "I would prefer to
 restate the question" suggests Professor Tollett:
 whether a racially sensitive admissions program which
 seeks to insure diversity and redress societal discrimina-
 tion is constitutional.
 In elaborating the reason why this matter of prelimi-
 nary description is by no means trivial, Professor
 Tollett went on to observe:
 This difference in characterization, I believe, has consid-
 erable influence on how one will react to the decision.
 ACADEME February 1979 / 57
This content downloaded from 156.56.168.2 on Tue, 07 Jun 2016 20:38:05 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 Thus, although Professor Van Alstyne accurately and
 fairly, indeed subtly, analyzes the case, he nevertheless
 tilts the reader's mind in a negative direction toward the
 special admissions program by stating the question so that
 it resonates philosophically in opposition to the Brown de-
 cision.
 He is quite right. How one phrases a question, any
 question, does indeed "tilt the mind." His own pre-
 ferred description most assuredly does this no less
 than mine. Which, then, is better? Is it true that each
 is no less instructive than the other, and that the true
 difference between them lies only in the supportive
 or in the hostile frame of mind of the author? I do not
 think that that suggestion exhausts the possibilities at
 all. I am very grateful for the chance to say why I
 found the manner in which the Regents characterized
 the question in Bakke entirely inappropriate and alto-
 gether too smug.
 One may explain the Davis Medical School admis-
 sions system, or any system, in any number of ways.
 Before undertaking to do so, however, it may none-
 theless be useful first to touch its most elementary
 features, to concede what they are, and thus to un-
 derstand why some sort of explanation seems to be
 called for. The Davis admissions standards were ra-
 cially unequal. The Davis admission processes were
 racially separate. Indeed, were it not for these fea-
 tures, no constitutional question would arise.
 Whether these circumstances are unavoidable as a
 means of providing diversity is important, no doubt,
 insofar as that may tend to provide some reason for
 an arrangement that must otherwise be thought
 highly improper. Whether these circumstances are
 unavoidable to redress societal discrimination is, at
 best, also a matter which, if true, may give appropri-
 ate pause to thoughtful persons before concluding
 that the arrangement should, despite its appearance
 of impropriety, not be constitutionally condemned.
 None of us, however, 4does any genuine professional
 service whatever to the difficulty of the ensuing is-
 sues by ^glossing over the very elements of the plan
 which are the essence of the controversy.
 At one time, I also saw the question very much in
 the argumentative style in which the Regents pre-
 sumed to present it, i.e., the style of maximum posi-
 tive description. But I have privately tested that ap-
 proach by letting it be used equivalently in other
 cases, discovering that it works only too well with
 equally devastating effect to "tilt the mind" too
 much. It induces a congenial acquiescence precisely
 when the academic mind needs encouragement to be
 critical instead. Indeed, my objection to its use in be-
 half of causes we may deem to be wholly just is no
 different from my objection to its use in behalf of
 causes we may think to be despicable: its intellectual
 vice is that it literally leaves no room at all to stand
 against its sheer complacency.
 Suppose that the case we had been considering
 were not Bakke, in 1978, but rather a close likeness of
 Plessy v. Ferguson, in 1896. Suppose, that is, it were a
 case just then contemporary involving the review of
 a state statute requiring racially separate public
 schools. I should have thought it reasonable to state
 the question in that case, equivalent to the dry and
 noncommittal form I used for Bakke, pretty much as
 follows:
 Whether state statutes requiring racially separate public
 schools are constitutionally condemned.
 But a reasonably parallel form of putting the ques-
 tion according to the rhetoric of maximum positive
 description (like that of the Regents in Bakke) would
 have been something more like this:
 Whether a racially sensitive school assignment policy
 which seeks to minimize the occasions for racial friction
 and to assure a historically disadvantaged minority an
 equal opportunity to develop its own course free from
 domination in schools in which its culture would become
 submerged and its children likely to be overwhelmed by a
 racial majority which has for two centuries presumed to
 oppress it, is constitutional.
 This question is self-answering: a governmental plan
 accomplishing so much good (and the question as
 formulated acknowledges no other possibility) must
 assuredly be constitutional. And so, indeed, might
 one rewrite Plessy v. Ferguson even now.
 If it is true that my description of the basic ques-
 tion in Bakke was more jarring to the sensibilities of
 readers than seemed either necessary or even in good
 taste, it is because I have looked back at the con-
 sequences of sharing the congeniality of more "sensi-
 tive" and less adversarial descriptions of what we
 have done before and found within them a disastrous
 courtesy. The state is called upon to account for what
 it does. We do no cause any good to proceed differ-
 ently about the matter in Bakke than we should have
 done in Plessy (but, in Plessy, as only the dissenting
 Justice Harlan presumed to do).
 As to the other comments on my brief paper, I have
 too little to say that could possibly be convincing to
 those not already sharing my misgivings about the
 basic issue. That issue is the constitutional licitness
 in the government's use of race, now deployed to re-
 58 / ACADEME February 1979
This content downloaded from 156.56.168.2 on Tue, 07 Jun 2016 20:38:05 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 quire less of some persons than of others, on the
 basis that this is a necessary and proper way to
 "help" them and yet communicate no intimation of
 stigma. I am admittedly doubtful that we shall "get
 beyond racism" by "first taking account of race" in
 this or in any similar fashion, and I remain apprehen-
 sive of an accordionlike fourteenth amendment that
 appears to provide no repose against the perpetual
 temptation to submit racial classifications to the vi-
 cissitudes of politics in this country.
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